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et al.: State Money

PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF STATE
MONEY FOR PRIVATE UNDERTAKING
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8(1):
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid
of any private corporationor association, or private undertaking;
nor shall the credit of the state be given or loaned to or in aid of
any individual, or public or private corporation or association,
or private undertaking, but the foregoing provisions shall not apply to any fund or property now held or which may hereafter be
held by the state for educational, mental health or mental
retardationpurposes.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Ohrenstein 854
(decided November 22, 1990)

See case analysis under SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE. 855
The court held that defendants were not subject to criminal prosecution for using senate staff in political campaigns since engaging
in these activities, prior to 1987, was not criminally prohibited by
Article VII, section 8 of the New York State Constitution. 85 6
COURT OF CLAIMS
Santangelo v. New York857
(decided November 7, 1990)

The New York Court of Claims questioned whether the legislature's amendment of the General Municipal Law (GML), section
205-e, 85 8 which allows the statute 859 to apply retroactively under
854. 77 N.Y.2d 38, 565 N.E.2d 493, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1990).
855. See infra notes 1177-226 and accompanying text.
856. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d at 52, 565 N.E.2d at 500, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
751; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8.
857. 149 Misc. 2d 171, 563 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Ct. C1. 1990).

858. Act of July 22, 1990, ch. 762, § 1, 1990 N.Y. Laws 1551, 1552
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specific circumstances, "can constitutionally revive" 860 the plaintiffs' cause of action, which had been previously dismissed
"following a full trial on the issue of liability. ' 86 1 Specifically,
the court questioned whether the legislature had the right to
infringe on the vested rights established by a final judgment of
the courts of this state resulting from the retrospective application
of section 205-e as amended in July of 1990.
The court held that although the defendant could not assert a
successful res judicata defense, 862 the amended statute was
unconstitutional to the extent that it was applied retroactively to
revive the plaintiffs' cause of action in which final judgment had
already been obtained. 863
The plaintiffs were policemen who were injured on July 15,
1979 while "attempting to arrest a mental patient escapee." ' 864
The first action was brought on August 20, 1979, and is referred
to as Santangelo I. After a trial on the merits, the first claim was
dismissed. 865 Subsequent to Santangelo I, the legislature enacted
GML section 205-e so that "officers who are injured in the line
of duty as a direct or indirect result of a person's violation of a
rule, a law, a statute or an ordinance ' 866 would have a cause of
action. The courts interpreted section 205-e as not applying
retroactively. Consequently, the legislature amended the statute
and made section 205-e expressly retroactive under the following
circumstances: 1) cases pending on or after January 1, 1987; 2)
cases dismissed on or after January 1, 1987 because the section
was non-existent at the time of the claim; and 3) cases which
(McKinney).

859. N.Y. MUN. LAW § 205-b (McKinney Supp. 1991).
860. Santangelo, 149 Misc. 2d at 175, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
861. Id. at 173, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
862. Id. at 181, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 603. The court reasoned that a res
judicata defense was not available because the "statutory amendment
materially changed the parties' rights to the extent that the new request was
independent of the first, and was thus considered a wholly distinct
transaction." Id. (citation omitted).
863. Id. at 184, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 605.

864. Id. at 173, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
865. Id.
866. Id. at 174, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
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should have been actionable if the section was in effect. 867
The plaintiffs sought to revive their claim based on the
amended statute. They brought this present claim, referred to as
SantangeloII, on August 27, 1990.868 The court found plaintiffs'
claim to be viable under the requirements of category two
above. 869 However, in the same breath, the court declared that

GML section 205-e, as amended, was unconstitutional in its
revival of the plaintiffs' claims in Santangelo L In so holding,
the court pointed to strong public policy, grounded in article
VIII, section 1 of the New York State Constitution, which the
court argued "preserv[es] and protects[s] public funds from
' 870
unwarranted and nonmeritorious claims."
The court first examined older cases that dealt with the issue at
hand. Under this line of case law, a strict and rigid approach was
employed that did not allow the legislature to infringe on vested
rights accruing to a person that were the result of a final
judgment rendered by the court. 87 1 This policy was based upon
the notion that the vested rights became the property rights of the
individual, which the legislature could not violate.872
The court then examined more recent case law. It noted that the
New York Court of Appeals, in Chrysler Properties, Inc. v.
Morris,873 adopted a more flexible approach to the vested rights
theory by recognizing that "'the concept is a fiction and hides
867. Id. at 174-75, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99.
868. Id. at 173, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
869. Id. at 177, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 600-01.
870. Id. at 183, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 604; see N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
871. Santangelo, 149 Misc. 2d at 179, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02 (citing
Germania Say. Bank v. Village of Suspension Bridge, 159 N.Y. 362, 54 N.E.
33 (1899) (holding that the legislature could not confer a right to appeal upon a
party whom has already exhausted his appellate resources unsuccessfully).
872. In Germania, the court stated:
A judgment is a contract which is subject to interference by the courts
so long as the right of appeal therefrom exists, but when the time within
which an appeal may be brought has expired, it ripens into an
unchangeable contract and becomes property .... It is then beyond the
reach of legislation affecting the remedy, because it has become an
absolute right which cannot be impaired by statute.
Germania Say. Bank, 159 N.Y. at 386, 54 N.E. at 35.
873. 23 N.Y.2d 515, 245 N.E.2d 395, 297 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1969).
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many unmentioned considerations of fairness to the parties,
reliance on pre-existing law, the extent of retroactivity and the
nature of the public interest to be served by the law.' ' 874 In
Chrysler, the court of appeals adopted a test that balances the
above factors and requires "showing... the public interest to be
served by [the] retroactive legislation .... "875
Accordingly, the Santangelo court examined the vested rights
secured by the state through the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims
in the first action. The court found that as a result of the first action, the state did not have to "expend public funds to compensate claimants as a result of the injuries sustained.,, 876 The court
argued that the principle of preservation and protection of public
funds is so important to the state that it is addressed expressly in
the New York State Constitution. 877 Even upon a legislative
finding that an injustice has been done, as a result of which legislation is enacted to remedy such injustice, the court of appeals
has stated:
[Injustice] cannot free the Legislature from the restriction placed
by the Constitution upon its powers when it attempts to use public moneys to remedy that 'injustice,' [sic] in cases where no
legal obligation to pay existed at the time when payment was
withheld.878
The court then concluded that there is no public interest to be
served by applying section 205-e retroactively. 879 Consequently,
the court declared the statute, as amended, unconstitutional in its
revival of the plaintiffs' initial claim, and the defendant's motions
to dismiss were granted. 880
874. Santangelo, 149 Misc. 2d at 179, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (quoting
ChryslerProperties, 23 N.Y.2d at 518, 245 N.E.2d at 397, 297 N.Y.S.2d at
725).
875. Chrysler, 23 N.Y.2d at 522, 245 N.E.2d at 399, 297 N.Y.S.2d at
728.
876. Santangelo, 149 Misc. 2d at 183, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
877. Id.; see N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
878. Santangelo, 149 Misc. 2d at 183, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 604 (quoting
Mullane v. McKenzie, 269 N.Y. 369, 376, 199 N.E.2d 624, 629 (1936)).
879. Id. at 184, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 605.

880. Id.
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